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The aim of this paper is to investigate both the efficacy and the 
stability properties of monetary policy rules in presence of 
heterogeneous consumers. We aim to underline the link between 
the well-known Taylor Principle and the demand-policy regimes, 
defined on the basis of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. By developing an analytical analysis, we show that 
the transmission mechanism plays a key role on monetary 
efficacy and equilibrium determinacy. 
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1. Introduction 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990, 1991) provide compelling evidence for 
the existence of heterogeneous consumers: households who can smooth 
consumption (Savers or Ricardian consumers) and agents whose current 
consumption equals current income (Spenders or Non-Ricardian 
consumers), which represent a strong violation of the permanent income 
theory.  
Spenders’ behavior can be interpreted in various ways. One can view their 
behavior as resulting from consumers who face binding borrowing 
constraints. Alternatively, myopic deviations from the assumption of fully 
rational expectations should be assumed (rule-of-thumb), i.e. consumers 
naively extrapolate their current income into the future, or weigh their 
current income too heavily when looking ahead to their future income 
because current income is the most salient piece of information available.
1 
The behavior of the Spenders is empirically important, with about one-
fourth of income accruing to them in the United States (see Fuhrer, 
2000).
2   With specific reference to monetary policy, Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1999) are among the first to estimate a simple output Euler 
equation, which is based on the simplest model of optimizing household 
behavior (there is no weight on past inflation).
3 Fuhrer  (2000)  obtains 
much better empirical results by enhancing the model of consumer 
behavior with Spenders and a habit formation process, which adds 
significant inertial output dynamics.
4 Muscatelli et al. (2003) stress that 
                                                 
1 See Mankiw (2000) and references therein. 
2 Muscatelli et al. (2003) find an even larger proportion. They suggest that about 
37% of consumers are Spenders, whilst 84% of total consumption in steady state 
is given by optimizing consumers. Spenders account for about 59% of total 
employment. Additional evidence is provided by Jappelli (1990), Shea (1995), 
Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2003), and Ahmad (2004). 
3 Estrella and Fuhrer (1998) and Fuhrer (2000) show that this Euler equation 
provides a remarkably poor fit to the time series data on aggregate output. 
4 With a single equation for overall aggregate demand, it is not easy to infer the 
exact weight on expected future output and there are essentially no other   3
existence of Savers increases the variability of output and inflation. In 
their model automatic stabilizers based on taxation tend to offset the 
impact of Spenders without resulting counter-productive.  
Recently, Spenders have been introduced, to study monetary policy, in a 
New Keynesian framework (Amato and Laubach, 2003; Galì et al., 2003).
5 
The presence of Spenders’ behavior may alter dramatically the properties 
of these models and overturn some of the conventional results found in the 
literature.  
Amato and Laubach (2003) explore the optimal monetary rule with rule-of 
thumb households and firms. By modeling consumers’ rule-of-thumb 
behavior as a consumption habit, households’ decisions today mimic 
yesterday’s behavior of all agents, including optimizing agents. The 
authors discover that, while the monetary policy implications of rule-of-
thumb firms are minimal, the interest rate is more sensitive to the 
presence of rule-of-thumb consumers; in fact, as their fraction increases 
higher inertial monetary policy is required.  
By contrast, Galì et al. (2003) show how the Taylor principle becomes a 
too weak criterion for stability when the proportion of rule-of-thumb 
consumers is large. However, the presence of Spenders cannot in itself 
overturn the conventional result on the sufficiency of the Taylor principle. 
By contrast, in the case of forward-looking interest rate rules, they show 
that the conditions for a unique equilibrium are somewhat different from 
those in a contemporaneous one. In particular, they show that when the 
share of Spenders is sufficiently large it may not be possible to guarantee a 
(locally) unique equilibrium or, if it is possible, it may require that interest 
rates respond less than one-for-one to changes in expected inflation. 
                                                                                                                                      
available estimates with quarterly data. Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2003) face this 
problem. 
5 Moreover,  Christiano  et al. (2001) investigate the effects of a rule-of-thumb 
behavior in firms’ decisions. Mankiw (2000) and Muscatelli et al. (2003) consider 
fiscal policy.   4
By using the Galì et al. (2003) framework, the aim of this paper is to 
investigate both the efficacy and the stability properties of monetary 
policy rules. Differently from previous works we tackle this issue from an 
analytical point of view rather than considering simulations/calibrations. 
By considering the problem analytically, we can discriminate between two 
different demand regimes (i.e. two IS-curves) characterized by different 
signs in the correlation between expected consumption growth and real 
interest rate. The introduction of Spenders into the DSGE New Keynesian 
model thus may explain the negative correlation between expected 
consumption growth and real interest rate sometimes found in the 
empirical literature. In fact, this correlation has been found to be low and 
sometimes negative across many of the industrialized countries (see 
Ahmad, 2004, Canzoneri et al. (2002)).  
The existence of different regimes plays a very crucial role on the 
discussion about monetary policy efficacy and equilibrium determinacy. In 
particular, if the correlation between expected consumption growth and 
real interest rate is positive, monetary policy efficacy increases in the 
fraction of Spenders (as Amato and Laubach, 2003). A reverse result is 
obtained if the correlation between expected consumption growth and real 
interest rate is negative. Regarding determinacy, we find that in the case 
of a positive correlation, standard results hold, i.e. if monetary policy 
follows a standard Taylor rule and determinacy is always associated with 
the satisfaction of the Taylor principle. By contrast, if the correlation is 
negative, we find different requirements for stability conditional on the 
magnitude of the effects of interest rate changes on the real output. Hence 
the non-conventional results stressed by Galì et al. (2003) hold only if the 
correlation between expected consumption growth and real interest rate is 
negative.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section outlines our 
basic framework. Section 3 describes the two demand regimes implied by 
the presence of Spenders. Section 4 investigates the stability of the model   5
under different monetary policy rules. Section 5 summarizes the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Basic Framework
6 
We consider a simple New Keynesian model augmented by Non-Ricardian 
consumers (Galì et al., 2003). In order to simplify the analysis and 
highlight the demand-side effects of Spenders’ behavior we do not consider 
any capital accumulation process. We assume a continuum of infinitely-
lived heterogeneous agents normalized to one. Savers are a fraction 1 λ − , 
they consume and accumulate wealth as in the standard setup. The 
remaining fraction agents λ  is instead composed by Spenders who do not 
own any asset, cannot smooth consumption and thus consume all their 
current disposable income.  
By solving the inter-temporal optimization problems of Savers and 
Spenders and aggregating, we obtain the following description of the 
demand side of the economy:   
(1)  ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 tN t t t t t N t t ci E E c E λζπ λ ζ ω + ++ =− − − + − ∆ , 
(2)  tt t yn ω υ =+ , 
Equation (1) is the aggregate consumption function, it represents a 
modified version of the standard consumption Euler equation, where  t c  is 
consumption,  t i   is the nominal interest rate,  t π   is the inflation rate. 
() ()
1 11
N ζ υκ κ
− =+ +  is the steady state share of Spenders’ consumption.  
Our Euler equation differs from the standard one in which the last term of 
the right hand side of equation (1) is absent. This is due to the presence of 
the Savers, which establish a link between the demand for goods and the 
                                                 
6 A large part of the model is rather standard (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 
1997; or Woodford, 2003). Thus here the model is only described in its main 
equations. The demand side of the economy is derived in more detail in Appendix 
A since it plays a crucial rule. A technical appendix with a full-model derivation 
is available upon request:   6
real wage  t ω  (see equation (2)). The variables  t y  and  t n  are respectively 
aggregate output and employment, while the parameter υ  is the inverse of 
the Frisch labor supply elasticity.  
The supply side of the economy is represented by a standard forward-
looking Phillips curve: 
(3)  1 tt tt t Ek x u π βπ + =+ + , 
where  tt t x ya =− is the output gap with respect to the flexible-price output 
and  t a  and  t u  are  (1) AR  processes (representing respectively an exogenous 
technology and a cost push shock). More formally, the cost push shock is 
1
u
tt t uu u ρ − =+    with  () 01
u ρ ∈, and  ˆt u ∼i.i.d.(0 ) u σ , .  
By considering the log-linearized production function
7  tt x n = , aggregate 
consumption is written as  
(4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 11 tN t t t t t N t t N t ci E E c E x a λζ π λζ υ λζ + ++ + =− − − + − + ∆ − ∆ . 
Current consumption depends on real interest rate (because of the Euler 
inter-temporal substitution effect) and on the current output level with a 
income (output-gap growth) elasticity of consumption equal to  () 1 N λζυ + . 
If λ  is equal to zero, i.e., all consumers may save, the income elasticity of 
consumption becomes nil and the standard Euler equation holds.  Indeed, 
it is worth noticing that the income elasticity describes the effects of 
consumers’ expenditure changes due to changes in real wage.  
After some more algebra, equation (4) can finally be re-written as: 









−+ Ω=  is the income monetary multiplier, i.e. the semi-elasticity of 
the real output to the real interest rate.
8  
 
                                                 
7 The production function is  tt t YA N = . 
8 It should be noticed that neither the share of Spenders’ consumption nor the 
Frisch elasticity depends on the fraction of Spenders (see Appendix B).   7
3. Demand Regimes and Monetary Policy Efficacy 
Equation (5) is similar to the standard one proposed by the New-
Keynesian literature, the existence of Spenders however affects the impact 
of interest rate policy on aggregate demand from both a quantitative and a 
qualitative point of view. According to the sign of the income multiplier, 
equation (5) individuates two different regimes. If the income monetary 
multiplier is negative, increases in the real interest rates are expansionary, 
while interest rate cuts imply contractions — otherwise the standard 
transmission mechanism occurs (see e.g. Clarida, et al. 1999).  
In other words, aggregate consumption (4) negatively depends on real 
interest rates and positively on current output by the income elasticity of 
consumption. This last is increasing in the share of Spenders, who are 
insensitive to interest rate movements, and in the extent to which labor 
supply is inelastic.
9 Hence, if Spenders are many and/or the inverse of the 
Frisch elasticity is high, the income elasticity can become greater than one 
and, as we can see in equation (5), the income monetary multiplier 
becomes negative, so that an increase in the interest rates causes an 
increase in output and aggregate consumption. 
Summarizing, two regimes can emerge.  
1.  A standard regime holds if the income monetary multiplier is 
positive. Such a regime is dominated by the hypothesis of life-cycle 
permanent income and thus by the consumption smoothing theory.  
2.  An inverse regime holds if the income monetary multiplier is 
negative and it is dominated by the liquidity-constraint effect, 
where an increase in real interest rates is expansionary and interest 
rate cuts imply contractions since a large part of the consumers 
cannot access to financial markets and saving.  
                                                 
9 In such a case, small variations in hours (and output) are associated to large 
variations in real wage and hence in the Spenders’ consumption.   8
Formally, the two regimes depend on a threshold value of λ . The 
















otherwise we are in the liquidity-constrained regime. The parameter 
() ( )
1 10 1 θη η
− =− ∈ ,   indicates firms markup, where η   is the elasticity of 
substitution across differentiated products.  
For relatively low values of θ  and high values of κ , the threshold value is 
greater than one ( 1 λ
∗ > ). In such a case, only the standard regime occurs 
since  [ ] 0,1 λ∈ . For relatively high values of θ  and low values of κ , the 
liquidity-constrained regime can emerge. In addition, if θ  is greater than 
05 . , λ
∗ is always smaller than one. Thus, in such a case, the liquidity-
constraint regime always holds for a value of λ  sufficiently great. Figure 1 
describes the relationship between the two regimes and the parameters θ  
and κ .  
Figure 1  
Panel (a) illustrates the two regimes. The white area is the standard one, 
whereas the dark area is the liquidity-constrained regime. As claimed, for 
combinations of relatively low values of θ  and high values of κ , i.e. points 
on the left of the black curve in panel (b) only the standard regime holds. 
The left curve represents the combinations of θ  and κ  corresponding to 
1 λ
∗ =  (the upper-bound). Flatter curves correspond to decreasing values of 
λ
∗. The liquidity-constraint regime is then more likely to be observed for 
relative high values of θ  and λ , and relative low values of κ .  
In the standard regime the efficacy of monetary policy, which is measured 
by the size of the income monetary multiplier, is increasing in the fraction 
of rule of-thumb consumers. By contrast, in the liquidity-constrained 
                                                 
10 The following condition implies that income elasticity of consumption is smaller 





+  (see the Appendix B).   9
regime, its efficacy is decreasing in λ . Formally,  0 λ ∂ Ω∂>  for  λ < λ
∗ 
while  0 λ ∂Ω ∂ <  for λ > λ
∗.  
The efficacy of monetary policy is represented in the figure 2, where the 
absolute value of income monetary multiplier,  Ω , vis-à-vis the fraction of 
Spenders, λ , is plotted.  
Figure 2  
Notice that without Non-Ricardian consumers, as  0 λ → ,  1 Ω→− , thus 
elasticity of the real output to the real interest rate is minus one, i.e. as in 
the standard case with logarithmic utility. In such a case, a positive 
correlation between expected consumption growth and real interest rate is 
found. As long as λ  increases the efficacy of monetary policy raises till 
Ω=+ ∞ (the income elasticity of consumption is equal to one). For λ λ
∗ >  
the regime shifts to the liquidity-constrained one (where there is a negative 
correlation between expected consumption growth and real interest rate), 
an interest cut affects positively real output and the efficacy of monetary 
policy is decreasing in the fraction of Spenders, i.e. λ .
11  
It is finally worth noticing that the optimal response of monetary policy to 
a variation of the natural rate of output, which is equal to a technology 
shock (see equation (5)), depends on the demand regime. As usual, in the 
standard regime the central bank should respond by increasing the 
nominal interest rate of Ω to offset a unitary shock. By contrast in the 
liquidity constrained regime it has to reduce the nominal interest rate of 
an equal amount.  
 
                                                 
11 Of course, for values of θ  and κ  implying  1 λ
∗ > , only the first (decreasing) 
part of the figure is economically relevant.   10
4. Taylor Principle and Determinacy
12 
4.1. Exogenous Taylor rule 
A description of the monetary authority behavior completes the model 
above-presented. Monetary policy can be described by an exogenous rule, 
which relates the interest rate to the other variables, or by an endogenous 
one, directly derived by the solution of an optimization problem, e.g. 
welfare maximization. One fundamental property which is requested for 
the monetary authority behavior is to support rational expectation 
equilibrium determinacy.  
Let us start by considering an exogenous Taylor rule as the following:
13 
(7)  12 ttt ix α πα =+, 
where  1 α  and  2 α  are both positive.  







The above determinacy condition has a simple usual interpretation. A 
feedback rule satisfies the Taylor principle if in the event of a sustained 
increase in the inflation rate by one percentage point, the nominal interest 
rate will eventually be raised by more than one percentage point. Each 
percentage point of permanent increase in the inflation rate implies an 
increase in the long-run average output gap of ( )
1 1 k β
− −  percent.  An 
exogenous Taylor rule thus conforms to the Taylor principle if and only if 
its coefficients satisfy  ()
1
12 11 ak a β
− +− >   (see, among others, Woodford, 
2004).  
                                                 
12 The proofs of determinacy conditions are provided in Appendix C. 
13 John Taylor has proposed that U.S. monetary policy in recent years can be 
described by an interest-rate feedback rule as that considered here (see, among 
others, Taylor (1993 and 1999) or Woodford (2004)).   11
In the liquidity-constrained regime, Ω   is negative. To simply the 
exposition, we redefine it as Ω =− Ω, which is a positive measure of 
monetary policy efficacy. Determinacy thus requires 
(9)  12 2
12 1
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β + Ω> , the Taylor principle (9) holds, but the equilibrium is stable also 






⎜⎟ Ω ⎝⎠ <− , − − . By contrast, if 
1
k
β + Ω< , 
1 2
12 1 k aa
β + ⎛⎞








⎩⎭ <− , −  is requested.  
Summarizing, in the standard regime, the Taylor principle is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for determinacy. In the liquidity-constrained 
regime, we have to consider two cases.  
a)  If monetary policy has a relative high efficacy ( ( )
1 1 k β
− Ω> + ), the 
Taylor principle is only a sufficient condition for determinacy since 
also a (relatively) loose policy leads to the same result.  
b)  By contrast, if monetary policy has a relatively low efficacy 
( ()
1 1 k β
− Ω< + ), the Taylor principle does not leads to determinacy, 
a sufficient condition for determinacy requires a stronger reaction to 
inflation or, also in this case, a (relatively) loose policy.  
The economic intuition of our results will be clearer after describing the 
case on an endogenous-Taylor rule and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in the liquidity-constrained regime.  
4.2. Endogenous-Taylor rule (flexible-inflation targeting) 
The monetary policy procedures consistent with loss minimization may be 
often represented as forward-looking relations between interest rate and 
expected inflation. Formally, in such a case, the central bank should follow 
an optimal path for the nominal interest rate satisfying:     12
(11)  31 tt iE α π + = . 
where the coefficient  3 α   is determined by the monetary policy regime 
where the central bank act and the parameters of the central bank loss. 
Equation (11) is usually derived from the solution of an optimization 
problem
14 and thus represents an endogenous (forward-looking) Taylor rule 
since a Taylor rule of the standard form can be easily derived from it. By 
using equation (3), the forward-looking Taylor rule can be re-written in 
the form of equation (7), where  1
13 β α α =  and  1
23 k β α α = − . Determinacy 
can be easily studied according to the lines of the previous sub-section.  
However, note that now either  1 α  or  2 α  is negative according to the sign 
of  3 α .  







∈, + ⎜⎟ Ω ⎝⎠
. 
Equation (12) is standard and nests the Taylor principle: monetary policy 
should respond more than one-to-one to increases in inflation, and should 
also not be too aggressive as noticed by Bernake and Woodford (1997).  







∈− , ⎜⎟ Ω ⎝⎠
. 
Monetary policy has now to be conducted by a sort of inverted Taylor 
Principle. The central bank should respond less than one-to-one to 
increases in inflation. However, too loose monetary policies may also lead 
                                                 
14  More in detail, equation (11) is derived from the so-called flexible inflation 
targeting approach (Svensson, 1999, 2003) under different monetary policy 
regimes (i.e. discretion, commitment or timeless perspective). It can be also seen 
as the results of the utility-based welfare maximization (Woodford, 2003: Chapter 
6). However, to generalize our results to such a case one should show that the 
central bank’s loss parameters (and thus α3) are independent of the Spenders 
fraction. An analysis of the utility based welfare criterion is beyond the scope of 
the present paper thus we stick us to the interpretation of equation (11) as an 
optimal policy derived from an exogenous loss as e.g. Evans and Honkapohja 
(2005), i.e. flexible inflation targeting approach.    13
to indeterminacy. In particular, if monetary policy has relatively high 
effectiveness, 
1 2 k
β+ Ω> , indeterminacy may also derives from a loose 
positive reaction to expected inflation, i.e. 
( ) 21
3 1 k a
β+
Ω <− . The rational of the 
inverse Taylor principle is straightforward. A positive non-fundamental 
shock in the expectations reduces the real interest rate; in the liquidity-
constrained regime, if monetary policy is passive, it does not lead to the 
self-fulfillment of expectation since output falls. By contrast if monetary 
policy is set according to the Taylor principle, the real interest rate will 
increase as well as output and expectations will be self fulfilled.   
The determinacy requirements in the liquidity-constrained regime can be 
also interpreted in the light of the recent debate on the central bank’s 
conservativeness and market imperfections begun by Coricelli (2005). He 
shows that, in the New Keynesian DSGE models, determinacy requires a 
more conservative central banker as the degree of good market competition 
increases
15   As long as, the existence of rule-of-thumb consumers is 
interpreted as the result of non-competitive financial markets,
16 we find the 
same result of Coricelli (2005), but in a different context. In other words, 
market imperfections (financial market in our case) call for a less 
conservative central banker than under competitive ones.   
Figure 3 synthesizes the above results in the parameter space, panel (a) 
((b)) refers to a relatively low (high) fraction of Non-Ricardian consumers. 
In the standard regime, (white area) the Taylor Principle always holds. In 
the liquidity constraint regime we must distinguish between two type of 
monetary policy effectiveness: a relatively low effectiveness (dark area) and 
a relatively high one (light area). In the dark area, although an inverted 
Taylor principle holds, monetary policy leads to determinacy. By contrast, 
                                                 
15 This result contrasts with the finding in static context (see e.g. Coricelli, et al. 
2000). 
16 See Mankiw (2000) for a brief discussion on the different interpretations about 
the assumption of rule-of-thumb consumers.   14
in the light area, even if an inverted Taylor principle still holds a too loose 
monetary policy leads to indeterminacy.  
Figure 3 
In the standard regime, if the policy rule is not active, a non-fundamental 
increase in expected inflation generates an increase in the current output 
gap and, by the current Phillips curve, inflation increases, validating the 
initial non-fundamental expectation. The Taylor principle is needed to 
guarantee determinacy since an active rule generates a fall in output gap 
and thus in actual inflation, contradicting initial expectations. By contrast, 
in a liquidity-constrained regime, if the policy rule is active, a non-
fundamental increase in expected inflation generates an increase in the 
current output gap and an increase in inflation (by the Phillips curve), 
validating the initial non-fundamental expectation. Thus, in such a regime, 
the Taylor principle leads to indeterminacy, instead a passive policy rule is 
requested. In fact, if the central bank follows a passive policy rule, a non-
fundamental increase in expected inflation is associated with a fall in the 
real interest rate, a fall in the output gap, and deflation, contradicting the 
initial expectation that are hence not self-fulfilling.  
 
5. The Taylor Principle and the Monetary Policy 
Transmission 
The implications of liquidity constraints on the Taylor Principle can be 
better understood by considering the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. A key role in monetary transmission is in fact played by 
consumers’ heterogeneity, which affects monetary policy via consumers’ 
different choices.  
For instance, consider a cost-push shock that increases inflation. Real 
interest rate decreases on impact. Without liquidity constraints, decreased 
interest rate will increase output-gap, and thus inflation. If monetary 
policy does not intervene we can expect self-full filling inflation.  Given   15
that prices increase real wage decreases, therefore Spenders’ consumption 
falls and output declines. If the proportion of Spenders is high the output 
decline (via Spenders) more than compensates the output increase (via 
Savers), so that output gap will finally decline and a unique equilibrium is 
compatible in spite of a lower real rate. This means that the Taylor 
principle is not always a necessary condition for the determinacy. More 
importantly this monetary policy transmission mechanism justifies the 
positive sloped IS-curve which may hold for high proportion of Spenders. If 
instead the proportion of Savers is low, a lower real interest rate is not 
sufficient for equilibrium determinacy and the standard Taylor principle 
must be respected.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper introduces consumers’ heterogeneity into a DSGE New 
Keynesian model. We find that the existence of consumers who cannot 
access to financial markets (Spenders) can explain the negative correlation 
between expected consumption growth and real interest rate often found in 
the empirical literature. More in detail, by an analytical investigation, we 
individuate two different demand-policy regimes characterized by different 
signs in the slope of the IS curve. In fact, a high proportion Spenders can 
be compatible with a unconventional positive-sloped IS-curve (liquidity-
constrained regime).  
By considering the liquidity-constrained agents, we find against 
conventional wisdom that if the slope of the IS is negative, monetary 
policy effectiveness increases in the fraction of Spenders. In fact, although 
a smaller fraction of Savers reduces the effects of interest rate policy on 
the inter-temporal allocation of consumption, the greater fraction of 
Spenders increases the effects of monetary policy by the variations in 
Spenders’ consumption induced by real wage changes. By contrast, in the 
liquidity-constrained regime, the reverse effect holds.   16
The IS slope also affects the determinacy property of the rational 
expectation equilibrium. As long as a positive correlation between expected 
consumption growth and real interest rate is not observed standard results 
hold. Otherwise determinacy may be guaranteed by a passive monetary 
policy and the standard Taylor principle can be denied.  
More in details, in the liquidity-constrained regime, results on determinacy 
can be summarized as follows.  
1.  If monetary policy is set according to a standard Taylor rule, the 
Taylor principle is only a sufficient condition for determinacy when 
monetary policy is relatively effective whereas a more aggressive 
central bank is needed if the monetary policy has a (relative) low 
efficacy. However, irrespectively of the policy efficacy, determinacy 
can also be achieved by a relative (loose) policy, which clearly does 
not satisfy the Taylor principle. 
2.  If the central bank supports an (optimal) dynamic relationship 
between output and expected inflation, determinacy requires that 
central bank should react less aggressively (not satisfying the 
Taylor principle), but not too loosely, since, in such a case, a non-
fundamental increase in expected inflation needs an higher interest 
rate to be not self-fulfilling. 
Finally, we want to stress that our results are closely related to the 
empirical verification of the relevance of the liquidity-constrained regime, 
i.e. negative correlation between expected consumption growth and real 
interest rate, which is however outside the scope of this paper. If the 
liquidity-constrained regime matters, determinacy needs to be studied with 
more attention and, in setting their policies, monetary authorities must 
take into account of the regime where they are since a good policy for a 
regime can be explosive in the another one. A possible additional factor 
explaining the explosion of bubbles in emerging markets could be related 
to attempt of managing the monetary policy according to rules designed 
for developed financial markets in economy where the financial market   17
were not fully developed. This provocative reflection however is rather 
preliminary and need of more empirical verifications.   
 
Appendix A — The demand side 
Representative consumers are indexed by R  (Ricardian)  and  N  (Non-
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N φ = . We assume the following logarithmic instantaneous utilities, 













.= + − + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 with  0 χ >  and  0 κ > . By solving 
their optimization problems, consumers face the budget constraints: 
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, where  t W  is  the 
nominal wage at time t,  t Π  is profit sharing,  t TR  are Government lump-
sum transfer Note that real wages are the only source of fluctuations of 
Non-Ricardian disposable income and therefore they are subject to a static 
budget constraint, while savers (Ricardian consumers) are the only ones 
facing a dynamic constraint. In fact, since spenders do not save they 
consume all their current income and the amount of money they hold at 
the end of period t is equal to zero.  
By solving the Ricardian and Non-Ricardian representative consumers’ 
maximization problems, we obtain the following first-order conditions: 




tt t t t t Ci P E P C β
−













tt t t t t t PC E P C P M βχ
− − −
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− − =−   { } , jR N ∈  
Equations (a.2) and (a.3) are the optimal consumption for Ricardian (i.e. 
inter-temporal stochastic consumption Euler equation) and Non-Ricardian 
consumers (who consume the whole labor income). Equation (a.3) is the 
optimal demand for real money balances for Ricardian consumers. 
Equation (a.4) is; the optimal condition for the labor supply. From 
equations (a.4) and (a.5), it is easy to find that Non-Ricardian consumers 
supply a fixed quantity of labor, i.e.  1
1
N
t N κ + = . 
The aggregate consumption and employment are 
(a.6)  () 1
RN
tt t CC C λ λ =− +    
(a.7)  () 1
RN
tt t NN N λλ =− +  
From equations (a.5) and (a.7), we obtain the wage aggregate supply:  










By log-linearizing equation (a.8) we obtain equation (2), recall that  tt YC =  
in equilibrium. By log-linearizing equations (a.2) and (a.3) we find: 
(a.10)  () 1
RN
tR t N t cc c λζ λ ζ =− +  
(a.11)  ( ) 11
RR
ti t tt t ci E E c π ++ =− − +   
(a.12) 
N
tt t cw p =− 
Solving equation (a.11) for 
R
t c  and using equations (a.10) and (a.12) we 
obtain equation (1). 
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Appendix B — Demand Regimes 
This appendix shows the independence between the income monetary 
multiplier and the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. We need to relate 
the fraction of steady state fraction of Non-Ricardian consumption and the 
inverse Frisch elasticity only to deep parameters. 
Regarding the former, from the demand side of the economy, i.e. equations 
(a.3) and (a.8), we obtain  () ()
1 1 11
NN CC ζ υκ κ
− − == + + , recall that 
Ricardian consumers supply a fixed amount of labor.  
To find the steady state value of the employment, we introduce the supply 
side of the economy, but since it is rather standard we will briefly discuss 
it (a technical appendix is available upon request). As usual, we consider 
an economy composed by a continuum of firms (indexed by  [ ] 0,1 z∈ ) 
producing differentiated intermediate goods with a constant return to scale 
technology  () () tt t Yz A Nz = . Intermediate goods are used as inputs by a 
perfectly competitive final goods firm. In such a context, under flexible 
prices, all firms set their price equal to a constant markup over marginal 
cost, which, under the hypothesis of symmetric firms, is constant and 
given by  
(b.1)  ()
1 1 θη η
− =− . 
Moreover, given the constant return to scale technology and the aggregate 
nature of shocks, real marginal costs are the same across the symmetric 
intermediate good producing firms. Accordingly, from the cost 
minimization, real marginal cost is:  
(b.2) 
1
tt t t AWP θ
− = . 
By equating equations (a.8) and (b.2), we obtain that in the steady state: 
(b.3)  ()
1 N θ κθ
− =+, 
which is independent of the fraction of Spenders.  
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Appendix C — Determinacy 
Determinacy is studied by augmenting the log-linearized dynamic system 
(3)-(5) with a simple feedback rule (8), which also nests the simple case of 
the forward-looking Taylor rule of the form (12). From equations (8), (3), 
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By indicating with  () D .  and  () T .  the determinant and trace operators, we 
have: 














⎧ =+ Ω + ⎪
⎨
=+ Ω + +Ω ⎪ ⎩
 
The eigen-structure of matrix M  is studied by following Woodford (2003: 
Appendices to Chapter 4). Since the analysis of the standard one does not 
differs from Woodford (2003), we only consider the liquidity-constrained 
regime. In this regime, determinacy requires either: i)  ()1 DM > , i.e.   
()
1 1
12 1 aa k β
− − ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ <− − Ω ,  () () 10 DM TM ± +> or ii)  11 () () 1 0 DM TM ± +<. 
Being:  
(c.4)  ()() ( ) { }
1
21 () () 1 2 1 1 1 DM TM a a k β ββ
− ++ = + − Ω + + + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
(c.5)  ( ) ( )
1
21 () () 1 1 1 DM TM a ka β β
− −+ = − Ω − + − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   
from equations (c.4) and (c.5) we derive conditions (10) and (11), 
respectively. Moreover, by considering a rule (12), it is easy to verify that 
                                                 
17 In order to investigate the stability properties we do not need to look at the 
stochastic part that thus is omitted for the sake of brevity. We assume stationary 
disturbance processes.   21
1 () 1 , DM β
− => thus stability requires  11 () () 1 DM TM ± >−  and 
11 () () 1 DM TM ±< − . By considering 
1
13 α βα
− =  and 
1
23 k α βα
− =− , it is easy 
to verify that  11 () () 1 DM TM ±< −   is never satisfied. By contrast, 
11 () () 1 DM TM ±> −  requires condition (14).  
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